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DIGIACOMO V. TEAMSTERS PENSION
TRUST FUND OF PHILADELPHIA AND

VICINITY-EMPLOYMENT LAWERISA-THE THIRD CIRCUIT HOLDS
THAT VESTING AND ACCRUAL OF
BENEFITS SHOULD BE TREATED
DIFFERENTLY WITH RESPECT TO
BREAKS-IN-SERVICE PROVISIONS IN

PRE-ERISA PENSION PLANS
Joshua L. Peters*
HE Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), a
highly complex statute created to regulate and protect employee
retirement benefits, was signed into law by Richard Nixon in 1974
and became effective January 1, 1976.1 Among its many features, ERISA
renders powerless so-called "break-in-service" provisions in pension
plans, which otherwise cause an employee to forfeit earned benefits due
to a break occurring in the employee's service before benefits vest. The
statute defeats a break-in-service provision by requiring a plan to credit
an employee for years of service accrued both before and after a breakin-service. 2 In order to facilitate a smooth transition into the ERISA
standards, the Act specifically permits the terms of a pre-ERISA pension
plan to trump the requirements of the Act and give effect to a provision
3
that would disregard a break-in-service occurring before January 1, 1976.
The controversy that has split the Circuit Courts of Appeal arises because
this exception appears in the ERISA section pertaining to the vesting of
retirement benefits and is not repeated in the section governing accrualof
benefits. 4 In DiGiacomov. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Philadelphia
* J.D. Candidate 2006, Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University.

1. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000).
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 203, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053(b)(1) (2000) [hereinafter ERISA statutes will be referred to using their original

name and section number after being cited to once]; Employment Retirement Security Act
(ERISA) § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1) (2000) [hereinafter "ERISA § 204"].

3. ERISA at § 203(b)(1)(F).
4. Id. § 203(a)(1).
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and Vicinity, the Third Circuit ruled on the validity of such a break-inservice provision in a pre-ERISA pension plan that provided for forfeiture of accrued benefits.5 The immediate question before the court was
whether the exception permitting the forfeiture of vested benefits should
also extend to the forfeiture of accrued benefits. 6 The Third Circuit incorrectly held that vesting and accrual should be treated differently under
ERISA. 7 Dismissing the sound reasoning of the Seventh, Fifth, and
Eighth Circuits, the court relied instead on selective statutory interpretation from the Second Circuit that focused on the absence of the exception
in the accrual section. 8 A more complete statutory analysis would honor
the integrity of the entire statute, lest one part be construed in such a way
as to render another part inoperative or useless. Further, the legislative
history of ERISA supports the conclusion that Congress intended to treat
accrual and vesting similarly with regards to break-in-service provisions. 9
Alfred DiGiacomo participated in the Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of
Philadelphia and Vicinity ("the Fund") for ten and one-half years, leaving
in 1972.10 For the next five years, DiGiacomo experienced a "break in
service," during which he worked outside covered union employment.1 1
He returned to "covered employment" in 1978.12 When DiGiacomo applied for his retirement benefits twenty years later, the Fund only
credited him for his last twenty years of service and (under a break-inservice provision in the terms of the plan) disregarded the ten and onehalf years worked before 1972.13 DiGiacomo admitted the Fund construed the provisions of the pre-ERISA pension plan in accordance with
proper contractual interpretation, but argued ERISA should trump the
14
plan's terms.
After exhausting his administrative remedies under ERISA,
DiGiacomo brought suit in the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, arguing that the Fund did not have the right
to disregard his years that accrued before his break-in-service. 15 He contended that calculations for accrual and vesting of benefits should be
treated differently under ERISA, and a break-in-service provision that
denies credit for a pre-ERISA break is only permitted when computing
5.
6.
7.
8.

420 F.3d 220, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 225.
Id. at 228.
Id.; see also McDonald v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 320

F.3d 151, 153 (2d Cir. 2003); Jones v. UOP, 16 F.3d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1994); Redmond v.

Burlington N. R.R. Co. Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 461, 467 (8th Cir. 1987); Dorn v. Int'l Paper
Co., No. 01-1196, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27016, at *12-15 (W.D. La. Nov. 6, 2002).
9. See DiGiacomo, 420 F.3d at 220-22 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing S. Rep. No. 93383, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4929, 4935-56; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, 1874
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4671).
10. Id. at 221.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 222.
14. Id. at 220.
15. Id. at 220.
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vested benefits.1 6 The district court disagreed and decided the exception
in ERISA that permits forfeiture of vested benefits under certain conditions also extends to a computation of accrued benefits.1 7 Since the Fund
was thus permitted by the statute to disregard DiGiacomo's years that
had accrued under the pre-ERISA plan, the district court granted the
8
Fund's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.'
On appeal, the Third Circuit limited itself to the same question:
whether, as a matter of law, ERISA required the Fund to include the ten
and one-half years of service before the pre-ERISA break when calculating DiGiacomo's accrued benefits. 19 The majority flatly disregarded the
reasoning of two previous Third Circuit cases, which supported the district court's holding in favor of the Fund, and dismissed them as having
no precedential value. 20 But Judge Alito, in his dissent, found no reason
to depart from the court's previous decisions on the issue and argued that
the ERISA section regarding accrual must be read together with the rest
of the Act, including the section governing vesting standards. 2 1 Yet the
majority, overly eager to follow a recent opinion from the Second Circuit,
held that accrual and vesting should be treated differently under ERISA
22
and reversed the judgment of the district court.
The Third Circuit began its analysis by explaining the distinction between accrual and vesting, namely that vested benefits are merely the
"nonforfeitable subcategory of accrued benefits. ' 23 The former is "the
rate at which an employee earns benefits to put in his pension account,"
while the latter is "the process by which an employee's already-accrued
pension account becomes irrevocably his property. '24 ERISA section
204, governing accrual of benefits, requires that all years of participation
be credited in computing accrual benefits, "beginning at the earliest date
on which the employee is a participant in the plan."'2 5 Though the statute
discusses accrued benefits earned before its implementation, 2 6 it makes
no mention of how those benefits are to be treated if a break-in-service
has occurred. ERISA section 203, governing the vesting of benefits, similarly requires all years of service to be credited in determining vested
benefits, but makes an express exception for pre-ERISA plans with a
break-in-service provision:
16. Id. at 224.
17. Id. at 228.

18. Id. at 222 n.4.
19. Id. at 225.
20. Id. at 224 (discussing Haas & Cass v. Boeing Co., No. 90-7414, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13240 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1992), affd without opinion, 993 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1993):
Tanzillo v. Local Union 617, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 769 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1985)).
21. DiGiacomo, 420 F.3d at 228-31 (Alito, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 228.
23. Id. at 223 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(19) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 749 (2004).
25. ERISA § 204(b)(4)(A); see also id. § 204(b)(1)(D).
26. Id. § 204(b)(1)(D)(i).
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..
all of an employee's years of service with the employer or employers maintaining the plan shall be taken into account, except that the
following may be disregarded: (F) years of service before this part
first applies to the plan if such service would have been disregarded
under the rules of the plan with
regard to breaks in service, as in
27
effect on the applicable date.
While both sections insist that an employee be given credit for all years
worked, section 203(b)(1)(F) permits a small exception for vesting calculations under plans that were in effect before ERISA, while section 204
fails to make any reference to the issue. The court noted the circuit
courts of appeal are split over whether the difference in the statutory text
between the vesting and accrual sections evidences clear congressional
intent to treat them differently in this context.2 8 The Seventh Circuit realized vesting and accrual are interdependent, and reached the logical
conclusion that an exception for vesting extends to accrual calculations as
well. 29 In contrast, the Second Circuit placed great emphasis on the fact
that the language of section 204 does not contain such an exception as
that found in section 203, and despite the illogical conclusions and inconsistent results of such an application, nonetheless held that Congress did
not intend to permit the exception to extend to accrual as well as
30
vesting.
The Seventh Circuit, in Jones v. UOP, was presented with a pre-ERISA
pension plan that forfeited years worked before an employee's break-inservice. 31 The court considered whether ERISA overrode the provision
of the pension plan by mandating that the pre-break years be counted,
when a "simple contract interpretation" would have upheld the agreement in the plan to forfeit those years. 32 Writing for the court, Judge
Posner observed that in ERISA "the purpose of section 204 [on accrual]
is to prevent the employer from defeating the vesting section, which immediately precedes it in the statute, by backloading benefits (that is, making benefits accrue very slowly until the employee is near retirement
age)."' 33 The accrual section prohibits backloading in a pension plan by
requiring that each year accrues benefits, and the very distinct problem of
breaks-in-service is, conspicuously, not addressed therein. 34 But it is presumptuous to infer that the omission of an express reference to breaks-inservice in the accrual section overrides the very provisions given effect in
the vesting section. 35 Rather, section 204 should be read in the context of
27. Id. § 203(b)(1)(F).
28.
29.

DiGiacomo, 420 F.3d at 224-25; see also supra note 8.
Jones v. UOP, 16 F.3d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1994); see also McClain v. Retail Food

Employers Joint Pension Plan, 413 F.3d 582, 586-87 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming Jones).
30.

McDonald v. Pension Plans of the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 320 F.3d 151,

153 (2d Cir. 2003).
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Jones, 16 F.3d at 142.
Id.
Id. at 143.
ERISA § 204(b)(1)(D); see Jones, 16 F.3d at 143-44.
Jones, 16 F.3d at 143.
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section 203, whereby equal accrual rates are utilized to prevent an employer from circumventing the vesting requirements of section 203.36
Otherwise, the result would create a windfall not intended by the drafters
of ERISA.

37

The Second Circuit expressly departed from Jones in McDonald v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund.38 The court affirmed a
district court holding that gave considerable weight to the silence of section 204 on breaks-in-service, positing that "had Congress intended to
permit pre-ERISA break-in-service provisions to apply when calculating
accrued benefits, it could have done so."' 39 The Southern District of New
York conducted a lengthy analysis of ERISA, the legislative history behind the Act, and the interpretive guidelines and regulations issued by
relevant agencies, and concluded that the plain language of the statute
"precludes a plan from excluding years of service based on its pre-ERISA
'40
break in service rules when calculating an employee's accrued benefit.
After summarizing the relevant case law, the Third Circuit correctly
began its analysis by undertaking the task of statutory interpretation, but
erred by narrowly selecting interpretive principles to produce the desired
result. The majority began by noting that "a court must begin with the
language of the statute. '4 1 Though this first canon of statutory interpretation is unchallenged, the court modified it with a second principle, that
"it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely
when it includes particular language in one section of a statute but omit it
in another. '42 The majority relied entirely upon the omission in section
204 of any provision permitting forfeiture of pre-break benefits. It concluded that because section 204 requires an employee be credited for all
"years of participation," but lacks a break-in-service exception, Congress
intended to override the express language of section 203 that permits forfeiture of pre-break benefits. 43 The court was clearly misguided in its
interpretation of the statute's plain language by utilizing such an arbitrary
selection of statutory interpretation principles. The principle that Congress acts intentionally when it uses different language between sections
of a statute is not the only interpretive guidance for the courts. Another
36. Id. at 144.
37. Id. The majority dismissed Posner's interpretation of ERISA by noting that the
plaintiff in Jones sought double credit for pre-break years, something not present in the
instant case, though nothing in Posner's reasoning suggests that the years must be counted
if they are only single credits. DiGiacomo v. Teamster Pension Trust Fund, 420 F.3d 220,
226 (3d Cir. 2005).
38. McDonald v. Pension Plan of NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 320 F.3d 151 (2d
Cir. 2003).
39. Id. at 159; see also McDonald v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust
Fund, 153 F. Supp. 2d 268, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
40. NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 286-88.

41. DiGiacomo, 420 F.3d at 227 (citing Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450
(2002)).
42. Id. (citing BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994)); see also City of
Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994).
43. DiGiacomo, 420 F.3d at 228.
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"cardinal principle of statutory construction" is that a statute should be
construed so as not to render another part inoperative, superfluous, or
meaningless. 44 The Third Circuit incorrectly chose to isolate section 204
from the rest of the ERISA and, in doing so, colored the meaning of
certain terms that otherwise depend upon the context of the entire statute
for their meaning. The majority advanced no authority for its decision to
read one section of a statute in isolation from the rest of the legislative
text.
A textually sound reading of the statute would include the entire ERISA text, and an integrated analysis of the statute's plain language would
reach a result that not only effectuates the purpose of the accrual section,
but also permits the vesting section to retain its full meaning and effect.
Section 204, in defining years to be credited toward accrual benefits, provides that the time should begin accruing "at the earliest date on which
the employee is a participant in the plan. '45 It also contains a cross-reference to section 202 of ERISA that requires "all years of service" to be
credited to an employee. 4 6 The silence of section 204 with respect to forfeiture, when read in isolation, appears to mean that those accrued benefits cannot ever be disregarded. However, a congressional report
explaining the purpose of section 204 indicates that the section should be
read together with section 203:
The primary purpose of [minimum accrual rates] is to prevent attempts to defeat the objectives of the minimum vesting provisions by
providing undue "backloading", i.e., by providing inordinately low
rates of accrual in the employee's early years of service when he is
most likely to leave the firm and by concentrating the accrual of benefits in the employee's later years of service
when he is most likely to
47
remain with the firm until retirement.
This purpose is most efficiently achieved by requiring "all years of service" to be credited equally toward vesting, lest slowly accruing benefits
defeat the vesting requirements of section 203.48 If an employee's rights

have vested, but there are few or no accrued benefits under a backloaded
plan, the heightened vesting standards of section 203 would be entirely
irrelevant. 4 9 Since it is clear that section 204 is intended to empower the
vesting requirements of section 203, it necessarily follows that if the two
are so entwined, the one should not be made to defeat the strength of the
other by reading it apart. 50 Indeed, the dissent in DiGiacomo declared
that "Congress evidently understood accrual as simply the handmaiden to
44. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001); Dept. of Revenue of Or. v. ACF
Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 340-341 (U.S. 1994); Jenkins v. Heintz, 124 F.-u 824, 833 (7th Cir.
1997).
45. ERISA § 204(b)(4)(A).
46. Id.; id. § 202(b)(1).
47. H.R. Rep. No. 93-807 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4688.
48. See Jones v. UOP, 16 F.3d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1994).
49. See McClain v. Retail Food Employers Joint Pension Plan, 413 F.3d 582, 587 (7th
Cir. 2005).
50. Id.
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vesting."'5 1 When the two sections are read together, the omission of a
forfeiture provision in section 204 becomes completely immaterial, and
the inference dissolves that it conveys an unequivocal, non-forfeitable
right to accrued benefits.52 The inevitable result of section 204's textual
isolation is that the strength of the exception in section 203 is entirely
emasculated if those same accrued benefits cannot be disregarded because of section 204. Reading section 204 out of context contravenes the
clear prohibition against interpreting one part of a statute so as to render
53
another part inoperative, meaningless, and irrelevant.
Regardless of whether the statute is characterized as sufficiently "unambiguous" to rely only upon a "plain language" analysis, an examination of the legislative history is warranted, especially considering the
circuits are split over the issue at hand. The majority in DiGiacomo relied on the a priori assumption that the statute is unambiguous and declined to examine the legislative intent behind it, though it referenced
competing analyses from two district courts. 54 In Haas & Cass, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania examined the legislative history and the reg55
ulations promulgated by the Department of Labor concerning ERISA.
The language in a Joint Statement issued by Congress clearly demonstrates that the legislature viewed accrual and vesting in the same category. Rules regarding breaks-in-service for both accrual and vesting
appear together in a section of the Joint Statement that contains the introduction: "rules with respect to breaks-in-service for vesting and benefit
accrual. '56 The same section of the Statement further confirms that a
pension plan may apply the break-in-service rules (if it is a pre-ERISA
pension plan) as "providedunder the plan," even if that plan forfeits some
previous years.57 Of course, this language is codified in section
203(b)(1)(F), but the majority in DiGiacomo insisted on limiting its effect
to vesting only (because it technically does not appear in section 204 in
the final version of ERISA), despite the clear legislative intent to extend
it to both vesting and accrual. Yet, if any doubt remains as to Congress'
intent to subject accrual rights to the vesting requirements, the general
section of the Joint Statement regarding accrual provides that the vesting
51. DiGiacomo v. Teamster Pension Trust Fund, 420 F.3d 220, 230 (3d Cir. 2005).
52. Id. at 229 n.15, 230 (Alito, J. dissenting).
53. J.S. No. 406, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5056.
54. DiGiacomo, 420 F.3d at 228 n.14. Contrast Haas & Cass v. Boeing Co., No. 907414, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13240, at *14-18 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1992), affd without opinion, 993 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding Congress intended accrual and vesting to be
treated alike with respect to pre-ERISA forfeitures), with McDonald v. Pension Plan of
the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 153 F. Supp. 2d 268, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding
Congress intended accrual and vesting to be treated differently with respect to pre-ERISA
forfeitures).
55. Haas & Cass, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13240, at *14-18.
56. J.S. No. 406, as reprinted in, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5051-52 (emphasis added)
(containing the cross-referencing text in ERISA § 202(b) that extends to accrual in § 204
which is intended to prevent backloading, and the forfeiture provision for vesting found in
§ 203(b)(1)(F)).
57. Id.
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rules "are to apply to all accrued benefits, including those which accrued
before the effective date of the provision (subject, however, to the breakin-service rules discussed above). '58 Finally, the Department of Labor
regulations clarify that for time accrued before the implementation of
ERISA, it is the pre-ERISA pension plan that governs the forfeiture of
59
any accrued credits, not ERISA.
The reasoning presented by the Southern District of New York in McDonald, which the majority in DiGiacorno relied upon, inexplicably
reached the opposite conclusion from Haas & Cass. The court addressed
the same Joint Statement and confessed that the text "appears to support
defendants' position," and that "defendant's reading of the legislative history is a plausible one."' 60 Nevertheless, it refused to read the Joint Statement as applying to both vesting and accrual, because the legislative
history never expressly states that accrual is subject to vesting. 6 1 The disparity between the accrual and vesting sections in the final statute created
too onerous a presumption that Congress intended them to be severed
from each other. Concerning the Department of Labor regulations, the
court predictably disregarded them on the same technicality. Though the
substance of the regulations declare that a pre-ERISA pension plan has
the power to forfeit benefits, the court noted that the regulations do not
explicitly authorize section 203(b)(1)(F) to apply to accrual. 62 Determined to reach a predetermined result, both the McDonald and
DiGiacomo courts simply refused to acknowledge any legislative history
confirming "that section 204 was not designed to afford any right to a
guaranteed retirement benefit apart from the Act's minimum vesting
standards. '63 The inevitable consequence conveys precisely the type of
windfall not at all intended by the drafters of ERISA. 64
The examination of the legislative history and the pertinent agency regulations soundly contradict the result of the Third Circuit's statutory analysis in DiGiacomo. The decision to read the minimum standards for
accrual in section 204 separately from the vesting provision of section 203
renders a portion of a highly complex statute inoperative and irrelevant.
Further, this isolated reading of the "plain language" conveys incredible
deference upon a silent inference created by "a lacuna in a complex and
58. Id. at 5056.
59. 29 C.F.R. § 2530.204-1(b), 2(b).
60. McDonald v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 153 F. Supp. 2d
268, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
61. Id. But see DiGiacomo v. Teamster Pension Trust Fund, 420 F.3d 220, 230 (2d Cir.
2005) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the absence of this technical language in the history lacks persuasiveness, since "the reports on the embryonic legislation usually do not
discuss accrual or, when they do, discuss it only under the rubric of vesting").
62. NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 281-84.
63. Jones v. UOP, 16 F.3d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1994). In dissent, Judge Alito noted that
the majority, relying on McDonald, decided that all accrued years must be counted under
ERISA. This conclusion betrays the majority's predisposed desire for a particular result,
as the question is not whether benefits must accrue every year, but whether certain accrued
benefits may be forfeited. DiGiacomo, 420 F.3d at 230 (Alito, J., dissenting).
64. See DiGiacomo, 420 F.3d at 231; see also supra note 24.
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highly reticulated statute. '65 Section 204 cannot be read without the context of the entire statute. Standing by itself, section 204 does provide the
answer to one question sought by the Third Circuit, whether
DiGiacomo's benefits accrued under the Teamsters' pre-ERISA pension
plan for each year before his break-in-service. 66 The answer is, emphatically, yes. However, section 204 alone cannot answer the more important
query, whether those accrued benefits can be disregarded under a breakin-service provision in the same pre-ERISA plan. The plain language of
the statute, the entire statute, as supported by the legislative history,
makes it clear that benefits accrued before a break-in-service may be disregarded because they have not vested. To permit otherwise would create a statutory anomaly. The Third Circuit erred by departing from the
sound statutory interpretation set forth by its own district courts and has
taken a position on the weaker side of a split among the Circuit Courts of
Appeal.

65. McDonald v. Pension Plan of NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 320 F.3d 151, 158
(2d Cir. 2003) (quoting defendant's brief).
66. See DiGiacomo, 420 F.3d at 223, 228-29.
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